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Tanzania is a small-sized economy, with a large portion of the population below the poverty 
line of $2 a day, particularly in rural areas. Finscope 2009, a national survey, provides 
evidence that 56% of the population has no access to financial services, a proportion that has 
slightly grown over the last few years. The main reasons given by respondents for not having 
loans, bank accounts or savings are practical obstacles (especially geographical distance), 
costs and lack of information – thereby suggesting that there is a large unmet demand for 
“accessible” financial services.  
Microfinance has endeavoured to address these needs, devising solutions to provide the 
poorer segments of the population with credit and – to a lesser extent – insurance, leasing and 
transfers. However, the Tanzanian microfinance market is still tiny, young, and dominated by 
a small number of major organisations; it is mostly active in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, with 
limited penetration in rural areas. What are, then, the barriers to its growth, and what steps can 
be taken to overcome them? 
Our study of microfinance in Tanzania, now at the end of its second year, addresses these 
concerns by widening its perspective, from case studies of individual microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) to the whole set of actors and stakeholders that operate in the field. More 
precisely, we adopt a network approach that places emphasis on the structure of inter-
organisational partnerships that relate MFIs to relevant stakeholders, funders, and regulators; 
by so doing, we aim to bring to light systemic issues and to identify suitable policy responses. 
 
A sparse network: inefficiencies and donor dependence 
To assess challenges and opportunities in Tanzanian microfinance, it must be acknowledged 
that its operations do not depend on MFIs alone but on the whole network of partnerships and 
relationships that exist between poor clients and the MFIs that provide financial services to 
them; between MFIs and their funders, be they multilateral institutions, donor governments, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), for-profit companies, banks or cooperatives; 
between MFIs and regulators. The resulting structure is intrinsically complex, consisting of 
many layers and involving multiple actors. 
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To shed light on the intricacies of the system, we have mapped the complete network of 
“wholesale” relationships through which MFIs based in Tanzania obtain credit from various 
institutions and organisations in order to support their activities. We have built an original 
database of lending relationships for 2006-2008, with 19 MFIs and 26 wholesale lenders. The 
database has been built from multiple sources, primarily audited financial statements and 
ratings of MFIs, which are verified by accredited third parties and are therefore highly reliable. 
Complementary information has been obtained from the website of TAMFI (Tanzania 
Association of Microfinance Institutions), a national network of microfinance actors; 
MixMarket, an international web-based data service; annual reports and web sites of MFIs. 
Finally, qualitative insight has been obtained through fieldwork, with a series of interviews 
performed by the authors with Tanzanian MFIs and other stakeholders in 2010 and 2011. 
The majority of MFIs have the legal status of NGOs; examples include BRAC, FINCA, 
SEDA, YOSEFO, and others. Together with them, community banks and even some 
commercial banks also operate in the microfinance market, for instance Access Bank, Akiba 
Commercial Bank, and Mbinga Community Bank. Notice that some of these banks are active 
both in the retail and the wholesale markets: for example, Akiba primarily provides retail 
micro-loans to final clients but has also once lent wholesale to Tujijenge, a MFI-NGO. 
Figure 1 represents the wholesale lending network for Tanzania in 2008. MFIs are represented 
as grey circles and lenders as black or white squares; a tie between a square and a circle 
corresponds to a lending relationship. Black nodes are banks and white nodes are other types 
of lenders (NGOs, government agencies, multi-lateral institutions, apexes and specialised 
microfinance funders). The size of round nodes (MFIs) is proportional to their number of 
lenders and, conversely, the size of square nodes (wholesale lenders) is proportional to the 
number of their MFI borrowers in the country. 
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Figure 1 : The network of wholesale lending relationships for microfinance in Tanzania. 
This is a non-cohesive, sparse network with small components and star-shaped sets of ties, 
representing MFIs that share few or no lenders. It suggests that MFIs have few lenders and 
tend to be dissimilar from other MFIs in terms of their patterns of debt relationships. 
Multiple reasons explain this finding. To some extent, lack of cohesiveness is due to the small 
size of the market and the fact that some MFIs are local subsidiaries of large international 
parent organisations (BRAC, FINCA) that are sometimes their unique or principal funders. 
More importantly, it can be said that lending ties constitute only a limited part of the funding 
channelled to Tanzanian MFIs, which remain largely dependent on donations. Indeed 
MixMarket data for 2008 show that on average, Tanzanian MFIs operate at a loss, with 
negative return on assets, and operational self-sufficiency below 100%. MFIs in the country 
often face solvability or liquidity issues, and company crises are a common occurrence even 
for some of the larger institutions; SEDA is a recent case in point. Funders are responsive to 
this situation: for example the Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSDT), established by five 
foreign governmental donors in collaboration with the Bank of Tanzania, offers both 
wholesale loans and grants; while it tends to encourage the former, it resorts to the latter for 
start-up or weaker MFIs. Donations are also provided by a number of international non-profit 
organisations such as Five Talents, Stromme Foundation, Swiss Contact, TRIAS, and World 
Vision. It must be acknowledged, however, that some of the larger Tanzanian MFIs have 
undertaken major efforts to achieve financial sustainability, and may in future set the example 
for others to follow. PRIDE attained operational self-sufficiency in 2001 and has always 
maintained it afterwards, with a positive return on assets. YOSEFO is also sustainable and 
relies primarily on commercial loans to sustain its microfinance operations, while it uses 
grants only for capacity-building and other supporting activities.  
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Another reason explaining the sparseness of the above network is that it does not include the 
large portion of microfinance activities that is undertaken by the so-called Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives (SACCOs). These institutions are very numerous (over 3500 in the whole 
country), of very small size and sometimes limited durability, more prevalent in rural areas. 
Major issues are their lack of accountability and their low reporting and performance 
standards (Triodos Facet 2007; EIU 2010; interviews with stakeholders 2011). They are 
supervised by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing, but rules are only weakly enforced. 
The Finscope 2009 survey reveals further inefficiencies, with 50% more savers than 
borrowers in SACCOs, thereby suggesting that many of them have surplus money and do not 
put it to its best use, despite a large unmet demand. For all these reasons, SACCOs are 
extremely difficult to map and have not been represented individually in Figure 1, which only 
includes their three main associations in the country. These are the government-sponsored 
SCCULT and two private associations, Usawa Kilimanjaro and Dunduliza; the latter 
comprises more than 50 SACCOs and receives funding from various institutions including 
FSDT, and technical assistance from Développement International Desjardins (DID) of 
Canada. In principle, SACCOs should rely primarily on members‟ savings to provide retail 
loans but it is not always the case, and many of them also borrow from banks and other 
financial institutions. The main provider of loans to SACCOs is CRDB, a commercial bank, 
but others are also active in this area, notably the National Microfinance Bank, a wholesale 
lender to MFIs, and to a much lesser extent MFIs themselves, in particular Akiba (with three 
SACCO borrowers at the moment) and PRIDE. These institutions often rely on SACCOs to 
lower the cost of reaching out more remote populations, generally located in rural areas and 
difficult to access.  
Because they do not take part in the wholesale lending market, informal providers of financial 
services have not been represented in Figure 1 either. These include ROSCAs (Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations), ASCAs (Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations), 
money-lenders, and personal relationships with family and friends. Though use of these 
sources is currently declining, they are still widespread in the country and particularly 
relevant for savings (Finscope 2009).  
To summarize, the unsatisfactory efficiency of a system that largely consists of low-
performing institutions (both SACCOs and some MFIs-NGOs) limits its capacity to attract 
funding from commercial sources, and slows down the growth process that would be 
necessary to meet the country‟s vast unmet demand for financial services. Banks tend to be 
more competitive but find obstacles in the limited productivity of the MFIs-NGOs and 
SACCOs with which they partner to expand their services to difficult-to-reach populations. 
   
Regulatory weaknesses and a need for capacity building 
One reason explaining the incapacity of many MFIs-NGOs to achieve financial sustainability 
as well as their difficulty in accessing commercial loans rather than donor funding is the lack 
of sound regulatory requirements in terms of financial accounting and reporting standards. 
MFIs-NGOs are required by law to register as companies, but are otherwise unregulated and 
unsupervised. Self-regulation is also lacking. Few Tanzanian MFIs report to MixMarket (13 
across all dates) and, even among those that do, only a sub-sample update their financial data 
regularly. The practice of obtaining ratings from external agencies is infrequent; one reason 
for this is that there are no rating companies based in Tanzania. Few rating scores have been 
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obtained from international rating agencies specialised in microfinance, notably MicroRate 
(PTF 2005 and 2007; FINCA 2004; PRIDE 2004), and MicroFinanza Rating (MuCoBa 2007). 
Collective initiatives to promote self-regulation have been conspicuously absent too. TAMFI, 
the Tanzania Association of Microfinance Institutions, has been inactive for long; only in 
summer 2010 has it been renewed, merging with the Coalition of Tanzania Microfinance 
Practitioners and Service Providers, a parallel industry network, and appointing a new board 
of directors. Although promotion of best practices is among its goals, no detailed plan of 
action has been agreed upon so far, not least because of limited funding.  
Improvements in transparency and quality of information shared would require MFIs to 
upgrade to a regulated form. Such a transformation would also authorise them to take deposits 
from the public, thereby providing them with an additional source of funding. In passing, this 
would be another, much-demanded service that they might offer to their final clients, who 
now rely primarily on informal providers (Finscope 2009). Regulated financial institutions, 
supervised by the Bank of Tanzania, include banks, non-bank financial institutions, Micro-
Finance Companies (MFCs) and Financial Cooperatives (FICOs). The required minimum 
core capitalization is different for each type but always relatively high; and reporting and 
accounting requirements are stringent for all regulated forms, often vastly exceeding the 
technical capabilities of MFIs in the country (Ellis 2007). As a result, only PRIDE Tanzania, 
initially created as a NGO, has obtained a licence to operate as MFC (2008); and no FICO has 
been licensed so far. It must be mentioned, however, that some other organisations are 
currently in the process of preparing to apply for a licence (YOSEFO for instance); PRIDE 
itself plans to further upgrade to bank status. 
One difficulty for many MFIs willing to transform into regulated financial institutions is 
ownership. Originally created in a state-owned and -controlled system, they have never 
undergone a formal process of privatisation so that the extent to which they are private or 
belong to the government is often unclear. While this ambiguity has few repercussions on the 
operations of NGOs, it becomes a major challenge for transformation, in that the Bank of 
Tanzania requires clear-cut information on ownership of supervised institutions.  
Other difficulties reported by some organisations are insufficient capacity and training, which 
raise issues especially at the level of middle management and induce a relatively high staff 
turnover. As a result, the position and role of leaders tend to be reinforced and the process of 
renewal at the top slows down, thereby hindering innovation at all levels – in managerial, 
reporting and accounting practices. Another consequence is a tendency to maintain existing 
funding ties rather than renewing –therefore missing opportunities for the creation of new, 
potentially more advantageous ties, or the destruction of less favourable ones.   
In sum, regulatory gaps and limits in the availability of resources at the system level appear as 
main factors underlying the inefficiency and fragility of the Tanzanian microfinance system, 
despite a potentially large demand for financial services, and despite continuing flows of 
donor funding.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
To conclude, our study points to the need of two types of measures: 
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1) The Tanzanian authorities should revise the national microfinance policy and financial 
markets regulation to address the problems that have emerged so far. In particular, it is 
important to: 
o Lower the minimum capital requirements for MFCs, or establish a step-wise 
procedure for MFIs to entry this category more gradually; 
o Devise a process allowing a clear definition of ownership rights for MFIs. One 
possibly solution might involve the creation of a MFC formally separate from 
the original NGO, the former being in charge of microfinance operations, the 
latter of supporting services (training, capacity building, and any social 
initiatives the organisation might be involved in). 
2) Donors should provide more resources in support of initiatives aiming at strengthening 
the industry at national level, rather than offering grants to individual MFIs. This could 
involve: 
o Support MFIs‟ coordination and self-organisation through TAMFI, to promote 
good practices, communication and networking with potential investors; 
o Provide seed funding for MFIs to obtain rating scores, promoting a better 
understanding of the benefits of being rated (as has been done with The Rating 
Fund, a joint donor initiative currently targeting Latin America and the 
Caribbean). This may also include initiating MFIs to Social Rating, a recently 
introduced service that aims to assess the capacity of a MFI to pursue its 
poverty reduction mission. 
o Provide funding for capacity building, especially at middle-management level, 
with focus on improvement of accounting and reporting practices. 
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